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Submission Details
Severity: high

Reentrancy in Staking contract.

0xsandy

Vulnerability Details

The claim() function of Staking.sol can be reentered. The claimable[msg.sender] is set to 0, after claimable[msg.sender] is transferred to msg.sender which clearly violets the CEI pattern as the state change happens after an external call. Basically an malicious user can have a fallback() through which he can reenter in the claim() function until all the WETH token amount is drained from the contract.

Impact

Anyone having certain claimable[msg.sender] amount can reenter into claim() and drain Staking contract to lose all of it's WETH token amount.

Tools Used

Manual Analysis

Recommendations

Make the state changes before external call. Change:

/src/Staking.sol
​
function claim() external {
updateFor(msg.sender);
WETH.transfer(msg.sender, claimable[msg.sender]);
claimable[msg.sender] = 0;
balance = WETH.balanceOf(address(this));
}

To:

/src/Staking.sol
​
function claim() external {
updateFor(msg.sender);
claimable[msg.sender] = 0;
WETH.transfer(msg.sender, claimable[msg.sender]);
balance = WETH.balanceOf(address(this));
}

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