Since the protocol is oracleless and has no checks to verify if the price of a collateral token suddenly drops exponentially to automatically liquidate the loan, we are able to giveLoan to another pool that matches the parameters of our pool, in the scenario that the victim is also not aware of the drop in collateral value, he will be assigned a loan which is unfavourable for him.
The function giveLoan allows us to give a loan to another pool, if some parameters of both pools match, namely:
As long as the loanToken matches, the collateralToken matches, the new interestRate is not higher than the old one, and the auctionLength is not shorter than the old one, we can give our loan to an unsuspecting pool.
Either intentionally or non intentionally assign a loan with unfavourable conditions to a victim.
Manual review
In this case we could use a 2-step procedure where the new pool owner has to accept the loan? That seems like a reasonable way to combat this.
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