The prizePool
is calculated in PuppyRaffle::selectWinner
using a divide by 100. This value can have decimals which will be lost as uint256
cannot handle decimal values. Since prizePool
is a uint256
value, any decimal portion will be truncated due to floor division in Solidity.
In PuppyRaffle::selectWinner
, on line 132, the prizePool
is determined using the following calculation:
If totalAmountCollected * 80
is not exactly divisible by 100
, there will be a precision less due to uint256
not being able to handle decimal values and the prizePool
will be truncated. The remaining funds lost due to the truncation will be locked within the contract.
The prizePool
will be smaller than the true amount, up to 99 Wei
and the remaining funds locked in the contract. The winner
will be sent a smaller prize than expected.
This will lead to a denial of service calling withdrawFees()
as the contract balance will not be equal to totalFees
even if no players are active. See issue "Unable to withdraw fees if contract balance is non-zero when no players are active" for more details. Based on the values in the deploy script of 1 ether
for he entranceFee
, this is unlikely but if the script is ever modified to use smaller units of value, this would have a high impact. This is therefore a medium-severity issue.
To mitigate the precision loss in the prizePool
calculation, use fixed-point arithmetic. Use a FixedPoint
library, e.g. from OpenZeppelin, for fixed-point arithmetic. This library is only compatible with Solidity versions 0.8.0
or later so the Solidity version will need to be updated.
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