A signed transaction can be exploited by an attacker to front-run the withdrawal of tokens from L2
to L1
, allowing the attacker to gain control of the tokens before the intended recipient. This vulnerability could potentially result in unauthorized token transfers if not properly mitigated.
The vulnerability allows an attacker to front-run token withdrawals from L2 to L1, potentially gaining control of tokens intended for another recipient.
The impact is that an attacker can manipulate token withdrawals, potentially stealing tokens intended for a legitimate recipient.
Manual review
Mitigating the issue primarily involves addressing replay attacks. To prevent replay attacks in the provided code, you can introduce a nonce and use Ethereum's EIP-712 standard for signing messages. Here's what you should do:
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