A user can simply call the checkList
function to qualify them for the second check.
To be able to call collectPresent
, a user must possess either Status.NICE
or Status.EXTRA_NICE
. However, a malicious user could manipulate their initial status. While this manipulation would not permit them to collect presents, it creates a significant concern. This action, which should exclusively be executable by Santa as stated in the docs, can be misused to deceive the protocol into believing that a user qualifies for a subsequent pass. This vulnerability undermines the integrity of the status verification process.
A user can bypass the need to be checked once and the protocol might assume that he qualifies for the second pass and thus, manipulate their actual status.
Manual Review
Add onlySanta
modifier to only allow the Santa user to call the function.
Anyone is able to call checkList() changing the status of a provided address. This is not intended functionality and is meant to be callable by only Santa.
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