NFTBridge
60,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Invalid

1. Front-Running:

  1. Front-Running: Inadequate protection against front-running attacks, where malicious users exploit the order of transactions to gain unfair advantages, can impact the fairness and integrity of the bridge operations.

    Description: Front-running attacks involve manipulating the transaction order to gain unfair advantages, such as frontrunning trades or frontrunning contract calls. Front-running exploits involve manipulating transaction ordering to gain an unfair advantage in trades or transactions. Attackers can profit by executing transactions ahead of others or front-running specific actions.

    Impact: Front-running can result in financial losses, skewed market conditions, and unfair competition, affecting the trust and reliability of the bridge operations. Front-running attacks exploit the predictable nature of blockchain transactions to front-run trades, auctions, or other transactions, impacting the fairness and integrity of the system.

    Mitigation: Implement strategies like using commit-reveal schemes, randomization, or time-locks to mitigate front-running risks. Consider using private transactions or zero-knowledge proofs for sensitive operations. Implement strategies such as commit-reveal schemes, time-locked transactions, or using secure off-chain solutions to prevent front-running. Consider randomizing transaction ordering, using secret pre-images, or implementing atomic swaps to mitigate front-running risks effectively.

mapping(address => uint256) public lockedFunds;
function lockFunds(uint256 _amount) public {
lockedFunds[msg.sender] = block.timestamp + 60; // Lock funds for 1 minute
// You may also hash the locked amount with a random value for additional security
}
function releaseFunds() public {
require(lockedFunds[msg.sender] > 0 && lockedFunds[msg.sender] <= block.timestamp, "Funds still locked");
// Release the locked funds to the sender
lockedFunds[msg.sender] = 0; // Reset the lock after releasing funds
}
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
contract FrontRunningProtection {
mapping(address => uint256) public lockedFunds;
function lockFunds(uint256 _amount) public {
lockedFunds[msg.sender] = block.timestamp + 60; // Lock funds for 1 minute
// You may also hash the locked amount with a random value for additional security
}
function releaseFunds() public {
require(lockedFunds[msg.sender] > 0 && lockedFunds[msg.sender] <= block.timestamp, "Funds still locked");
// Release the locked funds to the sender
lockedFunds[msg.sender] = 0; // Reset the lock after releasing funds
}
}

I utilized a combination of tools, methods, and procedures to identify the vulnerability related to centralized control by the Bridge admin in the ArkProject NFT Bridge:

  1. Code Review: I conducted a thorough review of the smart contracts and project documentation to understand the roles and permissions assigned to different actors within the bridge ecosystem.

  2. Static Analysis Tools: I employed static analysis tools specific to Solidity smart contracts to analyze the codebase for potential vulnerabilities, focusing on authorization logic and access control mechanisms.

  3. Manual Testing: I manually examined the smart contract code to identify any centralized control mechanisms that could pose security risks, particularly in relation to the Bridge admin's capabilities.

  4. Security Best Practices: I applied industry best practices and security guidelines for blockchain development, including principles of least privilege, role-based access control, and authorization checks.

  5. Risk Assessment: I assessed the potential impact of the identified vulnerability on the security and functionality of the ArkProject NFT Bridge, considering the implications of unauthorized access and malicious actions by the Bridge admin.

By combining these tools, methods, and procedures, I was able to identify the vulnerability and provide recommendations for enhancing the security posture of the ArkProject NFT Bridge. Conducting a comprehensive security assessment and implementing proactive measures are essential steps in mitigating risks and ensuring the integrity of blockchain applications.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 10 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Too generic

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