Valid high, given it can be executed on any chain that has a public mempool. - These two issues has similar root cause as issue #171 and duplicates, but is the only issue that highlights a valid exploit scenario that can cause a loss of funds - Issue #82 can forcefully cause funds to be stuck within the factory contract, given `createDeterministicERC1967` will not revert when a new Nexus Proxy instance is already deployed. - Issue #91 can forcefully transfer funds out of Nexus Account by front-running a creation, setting a allowance and then self destructing. Duplicating due to the following reasons: - Both issues are contigent on front-running an account creation, which is only possible since the salt use to deploy a new Nexus Proxy instance are user deployed. So the same fix of including `msg.sender` and/or a unique identifier would prevent these attacks. i.e. same root cause --> different attack paths - Both issues have similarities with issue #112 , but I would say is a unique issue given even if #112 is fixed, this issues will not be fixed