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TempleDAO
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Invalid

`DaiGoldAuction.sol#bid` function has no slippage control.

danielarmstrong

Summary

DaiGoldAuction.sol#bid function has no slippage control.
So the bidders who bid large amount at a time may lose funds.

Vulnerability Details

DaiGoldAuction.sol#bid function is the following.

function bid(uint256 amount) external virtual override onlyWhenLive {
if (amount == 0) { revert CommonEventsAndErrors.ExpectedNonZero(); }
​
bidToken.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, treasury, amount);
​
uint256 epochIdCache = _currentEpochId;
depositors[msg.sender][epochIdCache] += amount;
​
EpochInfo storage info = epochs[epochIdCache];
141: info.totalBidTokenAmount += amount;
emit Deposit(msg.sender, epochIdCache, amount);
}

As can be seen, the function has no slippage control parameter.

Scenario:

  1. Now assume that epochInfo.totalAuctionTokenAmount = 100 TGLD, the expected price of TGLD is 0.1 DAI and epochInfo.totalBidTokenAmount = 5 DAI.

  2. Since the auction is profitable as long as totalBidTokenAmount is less than 10 DAI, bidder1 calls bid function with amount = 5 DAI.

  3. While the tx stays in mempool, bidder2 executes bid function also with amount = 5 DAI.

  4. As a result, the totalBidTokenAmount will be 15 DAI and the bidder1 and bidder2 will receive 33.3 TGLD respectively for their 5 DAI, which means that the bidders lost funds of about 1.66 DAI respectively.

Impact

This issue may damage the bidders who bid large amount of DAI at a time.
The same problem exists in SpiceAuction.sol#bid function too.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Modify the DaiGoldAuction.sol#bid function as follows.

-- function bid(uint256 amount) external virtual override onlyWhenLive {
++ function bid(uint256 amount, uint256 maxTotalBidTokenAmount) external virtual override onlyWhenLive {
if (amount == 0) { revert CommonEventsAndErrors.ExpectedNonZero(); }
​
bidToken.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, treasury, amount);
​
uint256 epochIdCache = _currentEpochId;
depositors[msg.sender][epochIdCache] += amount;
​
EpochInfo storage info = epochs[epochIdCache];
info.totalBidTokenAmount += amount;
++ require(info.totalBidTokenAmount <= maxTotalBidTokenAmount);
emit Deposit(msg.sender, epochIdCache, amount);
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

inallhonesty Lead Judge over 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Design choice

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