The removeAuctionConfig
function is expected to reset an auction config either for an auction that is in cooldown phase or for an auction for which config is set but startAuction
is not called.
The vulnerability is present in removeAuctionConfig
function at line 113 which reverts when startTime for current auction epoch info is 0, but it missed the scenario where for the very first auction, as when config is set then startTime
will be 0, as epoch id is not incremented as a result of which config cannot be reset.
For the very first auction config set via setAuctionConfig
, the config is updated for the next epoch id, i.e 1
, the currentEpochId still stores 0, as it will be updated when startAuction
is called.
Now, for the requirement to remove auction config for the very first auction will fail, as it checks for the startTime for the current epoch id to be 0
and as for the current epoch id which is not used, it will always be 0 and as a result of which for the very first auction for which only config is set, the removeAuctionConfig
cannot be called.
removeAuctionConfig
will revert for starting auction, and auction config cannot be reset.
Manual Review
Remove the below check from removeAuctionConfig
:
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