The protocol uses Chainlink Oracle's min and max answer checks to prevent extreme price fluctuations. However, the min answer value is very small and cannot effectively prevent such fluctuations.
let check the limit impose by chainlink aggregator for price of assets supported by Zeros:
The price for USDT would be considered valid even if it falls to 0.0000002. For example, during the UST/Luna incident, UST was priced at 35 cents, leading to the largest stablecoin depeg. This demonstrates that the minAnswer alone cannot prevent a depegging event. Therefore, the protocol needs to impose its own limits for each asset to address such scenarios. The same applies to other assets.
Chainlink aggregator limits cannot prevent massive fluctuations and are also deprecated.
Manual Review
Impose limits on each asset to prevent such conditions.
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