Summary

This finding report identifies a centralization risk associated with trusted owners in the smart contracts implemented within the ContestManager.sol and Pot.sol files. The presence of functions requiring onlyOwner privileges poses a centralization risk as it necessitates the owner to be fully trusted to not perform malicious activities such as unauthorized updates or fund drains. Additionally, it highlights concerns with the potential loss of onlyOwner functions if ownership is renounced, which could render the contract unmanageable in case of critical issues.

Vulnerability Details

Low Issues (L-1): Centralization Risk for Trusted Owners

• Location in Code:

  • src/ContestManager.sol:8

    contract ContestManager is Ownable {

    ​

    Kopier kode

  • src/ContestManager.sol:18

    onlyOwner

    ​

    Kopier kode

  • src/ContestManager.sol:28

    function fundContest(uint256 index) public onlyOwner {

    ​

    Kopier kode

  • src/ContestManager.sol:53

    function closeContest(address contest) public onlyOwner {

    ​

    Kopier kode

  • src/Pot.sol:7

    contract Pot is Ownable(msg.sender) {

    ​

    Kopier kode

  • src/Pot.sol:49

    function closePot() external onlyOwner {

Impact

The centralization risk indicates that the system’s security heavily relies on the owner's integrity and trustworthiness. If an owner account is compromised, the attacker could potentially perform destructive actions such as draining funds from the contracts, disrupting the contest management, and conducting other privileged malicious tasks. This compromises the decentralization ethos and security promise often sought in blockchain applications.

Renouncing ownership of a contract transfers ownership to the zero address, making it impossible to execute any onlyOwner functions thereafter. This could be problematic as it eliminates any potential for administrative intervention to rectify bugs or unforeseen issues. Hence, relying on renounceOwnership can compromise the contract's manageability and security.

Tools Used

• Manual Code Review

Recommendations

• Multisig Wallets: Replace single-owner permissions with a multisignature (multisig) wallet mechanism. This approach requires multiple approvals for sensitive operations, reducing the risk of unilateral malicious actions.

• Timelocks: Implement timelocks on critical functions to provide a time window for community review and potential intervention before executing significant updates or fund transfers.

• Decentralized Governance: Introduce decentralized governance mechanisms involving stakeholders in decision-making processes. This could distribute control and reduce the centralization risk.