Since there is no verification for msg.sender
in KittyPool::burnKittyCoin
, any random account can call the KittyPool::burnKittyCoin
function and burn all the i_kittyCoin
minted by a user. This leads to the token holder not being able to redeem her collateral.
according to the design of the protocol, The pool also handles liquidations...
, hence only the KittyPool
contract should be allowed to handle liquidation
user can be liquidated prematurely by attacker.
loss of collateral for users hence funds get stuck in the protocol
DoS attack on the protocol as users may find it difficult to redeem collaterals from the protocol, hence protocol becomes unusable
manual review
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.