Summary

The protocol allows immediate withdrawals and deposits in Stakelink staking, for efficient asset flow. This is achieved by transferring pending deposits to users withdrawing assets from Stakelink, and vice versa.

However, the issue arises when queuing a withdrawal. First, if the deposit queue is non-zero, the withdrawal amount is filled with the queue deposit. If some amount remains, the queueWithdrawal function is called. This function enforces a minWithdrawalAmount check, which prevents users from withdrawing their assets if the remaining amount is below the minimum threshold.

Vulnerability Details

To withdraw assets from pool, user will call PriorityPool:withdraw function. which will call internal _withdraw function

It can be observed from the code that the withdrawal amount will either be fully or partially filled. The issue arises when the amount is partially filled, _shouldQueueWithdrawal=true, and toWithdraw < minWithdrawalAmount.

Impact

The user will not be able to withdraw assets from the pool, even if the initial withdrawal request meets the minimum required amount.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Add a check inside the _withdraw function to ensure that the amount queued for withdrawal is not less than the required minimum if the amount is partially filled from queued deposits.