Dria

Summary

In the unregister() function present in the LLMOracleRegistry.sol contract, there exists a vulnerability that prevents registered users from successfully unregistering as oracles. This issue arises because the function allows users to unregister without adequately validating their registration status against the actual stake amounts. As a result, users may find themselves stuck as registered oracles indefinitely, which can lead to potential misuse and operational inefficiencies within the oracle network.

Vulnerability Details

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

Attack Flow:

1. Stake Amount Configuration: The owner could set the generatorStakeAmount or validatorStakeAmount to zero using the setStakeAmounts function, leading to a situation where no financial commitment is required for registration.

2. User Registration: Users register as oracles without a stake, since the stake amounts are zero. This creates an entry in the registrations mapping with an amount of zero.

3. Failed Unregistration: When a user attempts to unregister, the function checks if registrations[msg.sender][kind] is non-zero. If the user registered without any stake, the function will revert with the NotRegistered error, even though they appear registered in the context of the oracle system.

4. Infinite Registration Loop: Since the user cannot unregister, they remain in the system without any stake. This creates a situation where the registration system becomes cluttered with users who cannot properly unregister, leading to inefficiencies and potential misuse.

Impact

• Inability to Remove Users: Users who wish to unregister cannot do so, leading to a growing pool of inactive or unnecessary registrations. This may complicate management and tracking of registered oracles within the system.

• Operational Inefficiencies: The inability to unregister can result in increased storage costs and operational overhead as the network is burdened with stale registrations that serve no purpose.

• Cluttered Registration Space: Over time, the registrations mapping can become cluttered with entries that are effectively useless, complicating future audits and event logging for active oracles.

• Loss of Trust: If users perceive the oracle system as having flawed management for registered entities, it may lead to distrust in the network’s reliability. This could dissuade new users from participating, ultimately threatening the sustainability of the oracle system and protocol

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

• Prevent Zero Stake Amounts: Update the setStakeAmounts function to ensure that both generatorStakeAmount and validatorStakeAmount cannot be set to zero. This can be done using the following validation:

• Enhance User Management Logic: Review and potentially redesign the registration and unregistration logic to ensure that it is robust against manipulation and allows for effective management of oracle registrations.