The smart contract provided has a critical reentrancy vulnerability in the burnBatchMultiple
function located at line 69. This vulnerability can allow an attacker to re-enter the contract during the burn operation, potentially causing unintended behavior or manipulation of the contract's state.
The issue lies in the burnBatchMultiple
function, which allows multiple addresses to burn tokens in a batch. In this function, the contract performs a burn operation without any safeguards against reentrancy, such as a mutex (lock) or checks to prevent reentry during the burn process.
Reentrancy Attack: The burnBatchMultiple
function can be exploited by a malicious user who controls one or more of the tos
addresses. During the burn operation, an attacker can create a contract that re-enters the burnBatchMultiple
function before the state has been fully updated. This allows the attacker to potentially burn the same tokens multiple times or manipulate the contract's state in an unintended way.
Loss of Tokens: In the worst-case scenario, this could lead to a complete loss of tokens from the contract, as malicious actors may burn more tokens than they are allowed or expected to, causing irreversible damage to the protocol's state.
MythX: Analyzing the smart contract for known vulnerabilities, including reentrancy issues.
Slither: Used for static analysis of the Solidity code to check for security issues, including reentrancy vulnerabilities.
Echidna: Fuzzing tool used to explore edge cases and potential vulnerabilities in the contract logic, especially around multi-step operations like token burns.
To mitigate this vulnerability, the contract should implement checks to prevent reentrancy during the burnBatchMultiple
function. Here are some potential solutions:
Use a Reentrancy Guard:
The simplest solution is to introduce a reentrancy guard mechanism, which can prevent reentrant calls during the burn process. You can use OpenZeppelin’s ReentrancyGuard
for this purpose.
Example Fix:
Check Effects and Interactions:
Ensure that state updates occur before external calls, such as token burns. Although this contract does not perform direct external calls, it is still good practice to handle state changes first.
Example Fix (with state update first):
Audit and Test:
Regularly audit smart contracts for reentrancy vulnerabilities using tools like Slither and MythX.
Implement unit tests and fuzz tests to simulate attacks and edge cases around critical functions like token burns.
The vulnerability in the contract is a classic reentrancy attack in the burnBatchMultiple
function, which allows attackers to re-enter the contract during the burn operation, potentially leading to unexpected behaviors like burning tokens multiple times or draining contract funds.
Attacker: The attacker will deploy a malicious contract that calls burnBatchMultiple
while re-entering the function via a fallback or receive()
function.
Victim: The victim is any user who interacts with the contract, potentially losing tokens due to the attacker’s manipulation.
Protocol: The protocol is the smart contract OWPIdentity
which governs the token minting, burning, and transfers.
The attacker deploys the Attacker
contract and triggers the exploit. During the execution of the burnBatchMultiple
function, the fallback function will be called, and the contract will re-enter the burnBatchMultiple
function, leading to multiple burns of the same tokens.
The attacker successfully manipulates the contract’s state and burns more tokens than intended.
The identified vulnerability in the burnBatchMultiple
function is a high-severity reentrancy risk, which could lead to token loss or unintended behavior. Implementing a reentrancy guard and ensuring that state changes happen before external calls are crucial fixes to mitigate this risk. Regular audits and fuzzing tests are recommended to ensure the continued security of the contract.
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