Summary

The updateMembershipImplementation function in the MembershipFactory contract allows an account with the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to update the membershipImplementation address. This function does not implement checks on the new implementation, nor does it have any verification steps to ensure the new implementation is secure or compatible. Without these safeguards, the function introduces risks that can lead to malicious or accidental misuse, ultimately affecting all future DAOs created through this factory

Impact

If an attacker or unauthorized user gains control of the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, they can:

1. Set a Malicious Implementation Contract: An attacker could set membershipImplementation to a contract that contains harmful logic, allowing them to:

2. • Redirect user funds or membership fees.

   • Control or manipulate future DAO membership contracts.

   • Insert backdoors or unauthorized access mechanisms.

3. Cause Downtime or Functional Issues: An admin might unintentionally set an incompatible or misconfigured contract as the membershipImplementation. This could cause the factory to deploy faulty proxies, impacting the functionality and availability of future DAOs created through it.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

1. Scenario: Assume an attacker gains access to the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. They use updateMembershipImplementation to set membershipImplementation to an arbitrary contract with harmful code.

2. Exploit PoC:

   • The attacker deploys a malicious contract, MaliciousMembershipImplementation, which overrides essential functions (e.g., initialize, mint) to redirect assets.

   • The attacker then calls updateMembershipImplementation with MaliciousMembershipImplementation as the newImplementation.

3. Attack Execution:

4. • From this point, any future DAOs created will use MaliciousMembershipImplementation, allowing the attacker to reroute membership fees and gain control over newly created DAO memberships.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Multisig Protection: Secure the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE with a multisig wallet to prevent unauthorized access. This can add an extra layer of security to avoid single points of failure.

• Whitelist Approved Implementations: Limit membershipImplementation to a whitelist of verified and compatible contracts. This ensures that only authorized implementations can be used.

• Implementation Validation: Add checks to ensure the newImplementation contract adheres to the required interface. This could prevent issues with incompatible contracts.

• Implementation Validation: Add checks to ensure the newImplementation contract adheres to the required interface. This could prevent issues with incompatible contracts