Description: The interfaces IAlchemist
lack robust access control mechanisms, particularly for critical functions like deposit, claim, withdraw, and administrative actions.
In IAlchemist
:
addYieldToken()
and setYieldTokenEnabled()
only have a basic admin()
check
No multi-signature or timelocked admin functions
Potential for single point of compromise
Impact:
Unauthorized users could potentially add malicious yield tokens
Complete control over protocol's token configurations
Risk of economic manipulation
Proof of Concept:
Recommended Mitigation:
Implement multi-signature admin controls
Add role-based access control (RBAC)
Use OpenZeppelin's Ownable
or AccessControl
contracts
Implement time-locks for critical administrative functions
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