Part of the purpose of the claimAndSwap
is to claim WETH and exchange it for alETH during depegs on the condition that they're on a premium, however malicious user can frontrun this function to ensure the critical condition of swapping at a preminum is not met and the function reverts.
this is the attack path
Attacker acquires large amounts of alETH from Curve pool
Price of alETH/WETH increases significantly
Strategy's claimAndSwap
becomes impossible because:
Either _minOut check fails
Or actual swap fails due to insufficient output
Strategy becomes unable to convert claimed WETH back to alETH
Opportunity cost from inability to execute swaps
Locked funds in wrong token form
Manual Review
Add a circuit breaker that counteracts market volatility
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.