DeFiFoundrySolidity
16,653 OP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Invalid

Single Point of Failure in Router Management

Summary

The StrategyArb contract exposes a critical vulnerability due to the management of the router address through a single management function. This design flaw creates a single point of failure that could be exploited, leading to potential asset loss or misrouting.

Vulnerability Details

The setRouter function allows the management address to change the router address without requiring consensus or additional validation. This lack of redundancy makes the system susceptible to exploitation if the management address is compromised.

Vulnerable Code:

function setRouter(address _router) external onlyManagement {
router = _router;
underlying.safeApprove(router, type(uint256).max);
}

Impact

If an attacker gains control of the management address, they can redirect funds to a malicious router, resulting in:

  • Loss of assets due to misrouting.

  • Disruption of strategy operations.

  • Decreased trust in the protocol from users and stakeholders.

Attack Flow

  1. Compromise Management Privileges: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the management address through phishing, key leakage or social engineering

  2. Change Router Address: The attacker calls the setRouter function to change the router address to a malicious contract designed to siphon off funds.

  3. Manipulate Deposits/Withdrawals: Any subsequent calls to claimAndSwap or other functions that utilize the router will interact with the malicious router instead, allowing the attacker to misroute or drain funds from the contract.

  4. Exploit Assets: The attacker can now withdraw or manipulate funds at will, potentially leading to significant financial loss for users and the protocol and even complete draining of protocol and users funds.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

To mitigate this vulnerability, it is recommended to implement a multisignature (multisig) governance model for router address changes. This approach should involve:

  • Collective Approval: Require multiple signatures from trusted stakeholders to authorize any changes to the router address, ensuring that no single individual has unilateral control.

  • Increased Security: Enhance security through collaborative decision-making, minimizing the risk of unauthorized modifications and potential exploits associated with a single point of failure.

By transitioning to a multisig governance model, the contract's security and resilience can be significantly improved, protecting user assets from unauthorized changes and potential attacks.

Updates

Appeal created

inallhonesty Lead Judge 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity

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