The deposit
function lacks validation for a deposit amount of zero, allowing users to participate in the event and emit the NewSignup
event without actually transferring any funds. This bypasses the intended logic of requiring a monetary commitment to participate in the event.
The function does not check whether the _amount
is greater than zero before allowing a user to participate. This means a user can:
Call the deposit
function with _amount = 0
.
Bypass the monetary commitment expected for participation.
Trigger the NewSignup
event, registering as a participant without transferring any funds.
This vulnerability undermines the integrity of the participation logic and could lead to abuse, as users can become participants for free.
changeParticipationStatus
The changeParticipationStatus
function properly toggles participation status but does not allow users to make financial commitments. By exploiting the deposit
function with _amount = 0
, a user can achieve similar results with the added benefit of misleadingly registering as a paying participant.
This vulnerability allows malicious or careless users to:
Register as event participants without transferring any funds.
Trigger misleading events (NewSignup
) without any financial commitment.
Potentially disrupt event organizers who rely on deposit amounts to gauge event funding or capacity.
Manual code review
Static analysis
Add Validation for Non-Zero Amounts: Ensure _amount > 0
in the deposit
function before proceeding.
Emit Separate Event for Zero Contributions: If zero contributions are intentionally allowed, emit a different event to distinguish them from actual deposits.
Strengthen Event Logic: Refactor the deposit
function to ensure that only valid deposits trigger NewSignup
or GenerousAdditionalContribution
events.
Test Cases: Include test cases for zero deposit scenarios to ensure proper validation and behavior.
By implementing these measures, the contract can ensure that participation and event signup logic remains robust and secure.
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