Potential Division by Zero in `calculateBlockNormalisedWeight`
Summary
Potential Division by Zero in calculateBlockNormalisedWeight
Vulnerability Details
The calculateBlockNormalisedWeight function directly divides by timeSinceLastUpdate. If timeSinceLastUpdate is zero, due to multiplierTime being equal to poolSettings.quantAMMBaseInterpolationDetails.lastUpdateIntervalTime, a division by zero error occurs, causing the transaction to revert, which disrupts the normal operation. The absence of a check for timeSinceLastUpdate > 0 makes this a direct vulnerability.
https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-12-quantamm/blob/main/pkg/pool-quantamm/contracts/QuantAMMWeightedPool.sol#L527
Impact
An attacker can front-run a weight update and cause a division by zero error by ensuring that the lastUpdateIntervalTime is equal to the block timestamp when the _calculateMultiplerAndSetWeights function is called, thus causing a denial of service to all users.
Tools Used
Recommendations
Add a check to ensure timeSinceLastUpdate is greater than zero before performing division. If timeSinceLastUpdate is zero, then it can return the weight without calculation.
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Informational or Gas / Admin is trusted / Pool creation is trusted / User mistake / Suppositions
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