The initialize function in QuantWeightedPool.sol lacks proper access control, leaving it vulnerable to continous calling and frontrunning attacks. This function sets critical initial parameters for the pool, such as asset weights, settings, moving averages, and oracle thresholds. Without access control, any external entity can invoke this function before the legitimate initializer, potentially misconfiguring the pool and disrupting its intended operation. This vulnerability compromises the security and integrity of the protocol, allowing malicious actors to exploit it for their benefit.
In this code the initilize function is vulnerable to frontrunn attacks
Invalid or malicious parameters could prevent the pool from functioning correctly, leading to stalled operations or incorrect calculations
Manual audit
Only the designated pool owner or admin will be able to call the initialize function
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