While UpdateWeightRunner implements access controls for pool management, it fails to protect against malicious admins deploying upgradeable hooks that can be later modified to extract value from users through excessive fees or liquidity manipulation.
Admin deploys seemingly benign upgradeable hook with normal fees
Users trust and interact with pool using this hook
Admin can upgrade hook implementation to:
Increase swap fees up to 50%
Reduce liquidity provided to users
Extract value through manipulated calculations
UpdateWeightRunner's access controls cannot prevent this attack vector
Users lose funds through excessive fees
Protocol reputation damage
Manual review
in QuantAMMWeightedPoolFactory white list NewPoolParams.poolHooksContract
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