(NOTE: This report is very highly inspired from this past valid report. Necessary changes have been made to suit the Panoptic Protocol.)
The attack consists of two parts: Finding a collision, and actually draining the lending pool
pool = _create(abi.encode(
QuantAMMWeightedPool.NewPoolParams({
name: params.name,
symbol: params.symbol,
numTokens: params.normalizedWeights.length,
version: "version",
updateWeightRunner: _updateWeightRunner,
poolRegistry: params.poolRegistry,
poolDetails: params.poolDetails
}),
getVault()
), params.salt);
Address collision can cause all tokens of a Pool to be drain.
Don't allow the user to control the salt used.
Consider also adding and encoding block.timestamp and block.number combined with the user's salt. Then the attacker, after they successfully found a hash collision, already has to execute the attack at a fixed block and probably conspire with the sequencer to ensure that also the time is fixed.
Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelyhood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.