The ChainlinkOracle contract critically undermines QuantAMM's TFMM mechanism by lacking L2 sequencer status validation. When deployed on Layer 2 networks, the _getData() function blindly retrieves price data without verifying sequencer operational status, creating a severe vulnerability in the protocol's automated portfolio management system.
QuantAMM's continuous rebalancing architecture becomes particularly vulnerable during sequencer downtime or delays. The TFMM mechanism continues executing weight adjustments based on potentially stale oracle data, while the sequencer's unavailability prevents any corrective market actions. This creates a dangerous asymmetry where portfolio rebalancing continues operating on outdated information, potentially mismanaging significant assets under the protocol's control.
In QuantAMM's composite pool structure, this vulnerability becomes systemic. When the sequencer is down, the temporal function calculations continue processing with stale data, causing incorrect weight adjustments across multiple linked strategies. BTF operations become especially risky as unit values and portfolio allocations may significantly diverge from actual market conditions. Upon sequencer recovery, the backlog of automated strategy adjustments could execute with outdated parameters, causing severe portfolio imbalances.
Implement L2 sequencer status verification:
LightChaser: ## [Medium-6] Missing checks for whether the L2 Sequencer is active ## [Low-22] Chainlink sequencer status is not checked
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