The supply and withdraw functions in IAave.sol contract do not contain any reentrancy protection. This could allow an attacker to exploit the functions and recursively call them, draining funds from the contract.
The supply and withdraw functions involve token transfers (ERC20 transfer or transferFrom). These functions are vulnerable to reentrancy attacks, especially when external calls are made (e.g., interacting with a malicious contract).
An attacker could initiate a reentrancy attack to repeatedly withdraw or supply assets, draining the protocol.
The protocol could be drained of assets through reentrancy attacks, potentially leading to a complete loss of user funds.
The lack of reentrancy protection in the supply and withdraw functions makes the contract vulnerable to reentrancy attacks. These functions involve transferring tokens, which could be exploited by a malicious contract to recursively call the function before the state is updated, leading to potential funds being drained.
Attacker: A malicious contract designed to exploit the reentrancy vulnerability by calling the withdraw function recursively.
Victim: The Aave contract system that holds users' funds.
Protocol: The Aave contract system responsible for handling user deposits and withdrawals.
Outcome: The attacker will be able to call the withdraw function repeatedly, draining funds from the protocol by exploiting the reentrancy vulnerability. The attacker can continue making recursive calls until the protocol is drained of assets.
Implications: This is a critical vulnerability, as it allows an attacker to withdraw more funds than originally intended by exploiting the reentrancy vulnerability, potentially draining the entire liquidity pool. This poses a significant risk to the protocol’s solvency and user assets.
Manual code review
Slitter
Use the ReentrancyGuard from OpenZeppelin or implement custom reentrancy guards to ensure that the functions are not callable recursively during execution.
State Updates Before External Calls: Another mitigation approach is to update the contract’s state (e.g., balances or reserves) before making external calls (like token transfers). This ensures that if a reentrancy attack happens, the state has already been updated, reducing the impact.
Checks-Effects-Interactions Pattern: Always use the "Checks-Effects-Interactions" pattern where internal state is updated (e.g., balances or state variables) before any external call (such as a token transfer). This minimizes the chance of reentrancy attacks.
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