The getReserveData function in IAave.sol contract provides access to critical reserve information, but it exposes the internal state without any restrictions. While this is mostly for transparency, an attacker could use this information to identify potential attack vectors or manipulate their strategy.
The function getReserveData exposes detailed information about the reserve, such as liquidity index, borrow rate, and various other parameters. While this is mostly used for monitoring, an attacker could use this data to craft targeted attacks (e.g., arbitrage strategies).
Lack of data protection or conditional access could be problematic in the future.
While the current risk of exploitation is low, exposing this data could give an attacker more information to manipulate their strategy, leading to financial loss in the future or enabling sophisticated arbitrage.
getReserveDataThe getReserveData function returns the reserve data, but it doesn't include sufficient validation or handling of edge cases related to the asset's reserve status, such as uninitialized or inactive reserves. This could lead to situations where a user or other contract receives incorrect or incomplete information about a reserve's status, leading to erroneous behavior in the protocol.
Attacker: An attacker who might provide incorrect asset data or exploit the lack of proper validation to gain incorrect insights into reserve states.
Victim: The protocol users who rely on correct reserve data for making decisions.
Protocol: The Aave protocol, which returns the reserve data without checking or handling inactive or uninitialized reserves properly.
Outcome: If the attacker interacts with an asset that has invalid, uninitialized, or inactive reserve data, the getReserveData function might return incomplete or incorrect information. This could lead to the attacker bypassing checks, manipulating reserve-related operations, or causing unexpected behaviors in the protocol.
Implications: This vulnerability could undermine the protocol’s integrity by allowing attackers to exploit faulty reserve data. Users might unknowingly interact with invalid reserves or withdraw more than allowed. Inaccurate data could also affect decision-making in decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols, affecting liquidity and stability.
Manual code review
Reserve Initialization Check: Ensure that the reserve data returned by getReserveData is validated to check that the reserve has been initialized and is active. If the reserve is inactive or uninitialized, it should return an error or a default value indicating invalid state.
Example validation:
Inactive Reserve Handling: Add proper checks to handle inactive reserves by setting a flag or status indicator in the ReserveConfigurationMap. If a reserve is inactive, the function should return an error or a status that indicates the reserve cannot be interacted with.
Example:
Edge Case Handling: Ensure the getReserveData function includes handling for edge cases, such as uninitialized reserves, reserves with invalid data, or incomplete data states.
Logging and Monitoring: Add event logging to track any invalid interactions with reserve data, so that protocol operators can identify potential issues and respond quickly.
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.