Summary
The TokenDivider contract lacks a mechanism to cancel sell orders. Once a user creates a sell order using sellErc20(), their tokens are transferred to the contract and can become permanently trapped if no one buys the order. The only way to recover the tokens is through a successful sale, which may never happen.
Vulnerability Details
When a user creates a sell order:
- Their tokens are deducted from their balance 
- Tokens are transferred to the contract 
- No mechanism exists to cancel the order and recover tokens 
- Tokens remain locked until someone purchases the order 
This creates a scenario where user assets can become permanently inaccessible if their sell order is not attractive to buyers or if the market conditions change.
Impact
- HIGH: Potential permanent loss of user assets 
- Users cannot recover their tokens if their sell order doesn't attract buyers 
- Forces users to keep unfavorable sell orders active 
- No way to respond to changing market conditions 
Proof of Concept
function testTokensCanBePermanentlyTrapped() public {
    
    vm.startPrank(USER);
    erc721Mock.approve(address(tokenDivider), TOKEN_ID);
    tokenDivider.divideNft(address(erc721Mock), TOKEN_ID, AMOUNT);
    
    
    ERC20Mock erc20Mock = ERC20Mock(tokenDivider.getErc20InfoFromNft(address(erc721Mock)).erc20Address);
    erc20Mock.approve(address(tokenDivider), AMOUNT);
    
    
    uint256 highPrice = 1000 ether; 
    tokenDivider.sellErc20(address(erc721Mock), highPrice, AMOUNT);
    
    
    
    
    assertEq(erc20Mock.balanceOf(address(tokenDivider)), AMOUNT);
    
    
    assertEq(tokenDivider.getBalanceOf(USER, address(erc20Mock)), 0);
    
    
    vm.expectRevert();
    tokenDivider.transferErcTokens(address(erc721Mock), USER2, AMOUNT);
    
    
    vm.expectRevert(TokenDivider.TokenDivider__NotEnoughErc20Balance.selector);
    tokenDivider.claimNft(address(erc721Mock));
    
    
    
    vm.stopPrank();
}
Tools Used
Manual review
Foundry for POC
Recommendations
Implement a cancelSellOrder function:
event OrderCancelled(
    address indexed seller,
    address indexed erc20Address,
    uint256 amount
);
function cancelSellOrder(uint256 orderIndex) external {
    SellOrder[] storage orders = s_userToSellOrders[msg.sender];
    require(orderIndex < orders.length, "Invalid order index");
    
    SellOrder memory orderToCancel = orders[orderIndex];
    require(orderToCancel.seller == msg.sender, "Not order owner");
    
    
    balances[msg.sender][orderToCancel.erc20Address] += orderToCancel.amount;
    
    
    orders[orderIndex] = orders[orders.length - 1];
    orders.pop();
    
    
    IERC20(orderToCancel.erc20Address).transfer(msg.sender, orderToCancel.amount);
    
    emit OrderCancelled(msg.sender, orderToCancel.erc20Address, orderToCancel.amount);
}
Consider adding a time limit on orders after which they can be automatically cancelled.