The pauseMarket
function in MarketMakingEngineConfigurationBranch
lacks critical safety checks that are explicitly required by the protocol's documentation. The function allows markets to be delisted before being disabled at the engine level, which can lead to a temporary state where users cannot access their funds.
The current implementation:
This contradicts the documentation requirement:
When a market is delisted without proper sequencing:
Users with open profitable positions can't claim their profits
The credit delegation system becomes temporarily unusable
Funds become inaccessible until the market is unpaused
Temporary Fund Inaccessibility:
Users cannot claim their unrealized profits until market is unpaused
Affects all users with open profitable positions
Recovery is possible through admin action (unpausing)
Protocol Impact:
Temporary credit system imbalance
User experience degradation
Potential trust issues if situation persists
Add Safety Checks to pauseMarket
:
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