In the CreditDelegationBranch.sol the _convertAssetsToUsdc function the executeSwapExactInputSingle
method of the dexSwapStrategy
is being used without a slippage control mechanism.
In this function, the executeSwapExactInputSingle
method is called without any slippage control, meaning there is no minAmountOut
parameter to enforce a minimum acceptable amount of USDC received from the swap.
Unfavorable Prices: In the absence of slippage control, swaps may execute at prices significantly different from the expected ones. This can lead to receiving less USDC than anticipated, causing financial losses.
Price Manipulation: Attackers might exploit this vulnerability by manipulating the market price at the time of the swap, resulting in highly unfavorable swap rates.
Front-Running Attacks: Malicious actors can front-run the swap transaction, leading to worse prices for the original transaction due to slippage.
Market Volatility: During periods of high market volatility, the lack of slippage control can result in extreme deviations in swap outcomes, causing significant financial losses.
Manual review.
To mitigate this issue, it is essential to add a minAmountOut
parameter and validate the actual output against it.
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