Liquidity Management
Gamma
DeFiFoundry
50,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

### [M-1] The `ONE_USD = 1e30` constant triggers unnecessary dust swaps, wasting gas and causing slippage—active inefficiency.

trepid

Description:
In PerpetualVault::runNextAction the constant is used to decide if a swap is needed

function runNextAction(MarketPrices memory prices, bytes[] memory metadata) external nonReentrant gmxLock {
_onlyKeeper();
Action memory _nextAction = nextAction;
delete nextAction;
if (_nextAction.selector == NextActionSelector.INCREASE_ACTION) {
(bool _isLong) = abi.decode(_nextAction.data, (bool));
​
if (_isLongOneLeverage(_isLong)) {
_runSwap(metadata, true, prices);
} else {
// swap indexToken that could be generated from the last action into collateralToken
// use only DexSwap
if (IERC20(indexToken).balanceOf(address(this)) * prices.indexTokenPrice.min >= ONE_USD) {
(, bytes memory data) = abi.decode(metadata[1], (PROTOCOL, bytes));
_doDexSwap(data, false);
}
(uint256 acceptablePrice) = abi.decode(metadata[0], (uint256));
_createIncreasePosition(_isLong, acceptablePrice, prices);
}
} else if (_nextAction.selector == NextActionSelector.WITHDRAW_ACTION) {
// swap indexToken that could be generated from settle action or liquidation/ADL into collateralToken
// use only DexSwap
if (IERC20(indexToken).balanceOf(address(this)) * prices.indexTokenPrice.min >= ONE_USD) {
(, bytes memory data) = abi.decode(metadata[1], (PROTOCOL, bytes));
_doDexSwap(data, false);
}
uint256 depositId = flowData;
_withdraw(depositId, metadata[0], prices);
} else if (_nextAction.selector == NextActionSelector.SWAP_ACTION) {
(, bool isCollateralToIndex) = abi.decode(_nextAction.data, (uint256, bool));
_runSwap(metadata, isCollateralToIndex, prices);
} else if (_nextAction.selector == NextActionSelector.SETTLE_ACTION) {
_settle();
} else if (_nextAction.selector == NextActionSelector.FINALIZE) {
if (IERC20(indexToken).balanceOf(address(this)) * prices.indexTokenPrice.min >= ONE_USD) {
(, bytes memory data) = abi.decode(metadata[1], (PROTOCOL, bytes));
_doDexSwap(data, false);
}
_finalize(_nextAction.data);
} else if (positionIsClosed == false && _isFundIdle()) {
flow = FLOW.COMPOUND;
if (_isLongOneLeverage(beenLong)) {
_runSwap(metadata, true, prices);
} else {
(uint256 acceptablePrice) = abi.decode(metadata[0], (uint256));
_createIncreasePosition(beenLong, acceptablePrice, prices);
}
} else {
revert Error.InvalidCall();
}
}

KeeperProxy calls PerpetualVault::runNextAction passing MarketPrices with min triggering this check

if (IERC20(indexToken).balanceOf(address(this)) * prices.indexTokenPrice.min >= ONE_USD)
​

impact:
Unnecessary Swaps:
Scenario: Vault has 1 wei USDC (0.000001 USDC):
Check: 1 * 1e30 ≥ 1e30 → True.
Keeper triggers a swap (GMX or Paraswap) for 0.000001 USD.

Gas cost: 100k gas ($50 at 25 gwei, $2000/ETH) vs. value swapped (~$0.000001).

Frequency: Dust from GMX fees (GmxProxy.afterOrderExecution), Paraswap swaps, or user actions accumulates often.
Result: Significant gas waste (~$50+ per swap), slippage on tiny amounts, reducing vault profitability.

Missed Swaps:
Intended to block swaps below 1 USD, but scaling is wrong:
Should be balance * price.min >= 1e6 * 1e30 (USDC) or 1e18 * 1e30 (ETH).
Current check allows dust swaps, not missing valid ones.
Result: No missed swaps—over-triggering instead.

Proof of Concept:
Check: 1 * 1e30 ≥ 1e30 → True.
Keeper triggers a swap (GMX or Paraswap) for 0.000001 USD.
Gas cost: 100k gas ($50 at 25 gwei, $2000/ETH) vs. value swapped (~$0.000001).
Frequency: Dust from GMX fees (GmxProxy.afterOrderExecution), Paraswap swaps, or user actions accumulates often.

Recomended Mitigation:

uint256 constant ONE_USD = 1e30;
uint256 balance = IERC20(indexToken).balanceOf(address(this));
uint256 decimals = IERC20Meta(indexToken).decimals();
if (balance * prices.indexTokenPrice.min >= 10**decimals * ONE_USD) {
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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