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Gamma
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

Privileged Functions Lack Time-locks

antoanrusinov

[MEDIUM-2] Privileged Functions Lack Time-locks

Location

Multiple administrative functions across the protocol

Description

Critical protocol functions can be executed by privileged addresses without any time delay or additional signatures, creating centralization risks.

Impact

  • Single point of failure through admin key compromise

  • No time for community reaction to critical changes

  • Potential for malicious instant changes

Proof of Concept

contract PrivilegedFunctionTest is Test {
PerpetualVault public vault;
address admin = address(0x1);
function testInstantCriticalChanges() public {
vm.startPrank(admin);
// Instant critical parameter changes
vault.setMaxLeverage(100);
vault.setPause(true);
vault.setFees(1000);
// All changes take effect immediately
assertEq(vault.maxLeverage(), 100);
assertTrue(vault.paused());
assertEq(vault.fees(), 1000);
}
}

Recommendation

Implement time-lock mechanism for critical functions:

contract PerpetualVault {
struct PendingChange {
bytes32 functionId;
bytes params;
uint256 effectiveTime;
bool executed;
}
uint256 public constant TIMELOCK_DELAY = 24 hours;
mapping(bytes32 => PendingChange) public pendingChanges;
function scheduleChange(bytes32 functionId, bytes calldata params) external onlyOwner {
pendingChanges[functionId] = PendingChange({
functionId: functionId,
params: params,
effectiveTime: block.timestamp + TIMELOCK_DELAY,
executed: false
});
emit ChangeScheduled(functionId, params, block.timestamp + TIMELOCK_DELAY);
}
function executeChange(bytes32 functionId) external onlyOwner {
PendingChange storage change = pendingChanges[functionId];
require(block.timestamp >= change.effectiveTime, "Timelock not expired");
require(!change.executed, "Already executed");
change.executed = true;
_executeChange(functionId, change.params);
}
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 8 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 8 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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