Liquidity Management
Gamma
DeFiFoundry
50,000 USDC
View results
Previous Next
Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

_minDepositAmount variable should be checked if not zero

mizila_firox

Summary

check _minDepositAmount if not zero

Vulnerability Details

make sure _minDepositAmount is not zero else this snippet in the deposit function will allow for a spamming of zero deposits. both amount and minDepositAmount are uints so they can't be less than zero so it would pass if not defined in the initializer or in its set function.

if (amount < minDepositAmount) {
revert Error.InsufficientAmount();
}

https://github.com/CodeHawks-Contests/2025-02-gamma/blob/main/contracts/PerpetualVault.sol#L168-L205

function initialize(
address _market,
address _keeper,
address _treasury,
address _gmxProxy,
address _vaultReader,
uint256 _minDepositAmount,
uint256 _maxDepositAmount,
uint256 _leverage
) external initializer {
__Ownable2Step_init();
__ReentrancyGuard_init();
if (
_market == address(0) ||
_gmxProxy == address(0) ||
_keeper == address(0) ||
_vaultReader == address(0) ||
_treasury == address(0)
) {
revert Error.ZeroValue();
}
market = _market;
IGmxProxy(_gmxProxy).setPerpVault(address(this), market);
gmxProxy = IGmxProxy(_gmxProxy);
MarketProps memory marketInfo = IVaultReader(_vaultReader).getMarket(market);
indexToken = marketInfo.indexToken;
collateralToken = IERC20(marketInfo.shortToken);
keeper = _keeper;
treasury = _treasury;
vaultReader = IVaultReader(_vaultReader);
governanceFee = 500; // 5%
minDepositAmount = _minDepositAmount;
maxDepositAmount = _maxDepositAmount;
callbackGasLimit = 2_000_000;
positionIsClosed = true;
lockTime = 7 * 24 * 3600; // 1 week
leverage = _leverage;
}

Impact

not checking this variable could allow spamming of the deposit function with zero value

Tools Used

manual

Recommendations

check the _minDepositAmount variable

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 8 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 8 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.