Missing Expiration Time Check in `cancelOrder` Function
Summary
The cancelOrder function in the PerpetualVault contract is supposed to cancel an order only after the expiration time has passed. However, there is no actual check for the expiration time in the function implementation. This allows orders to be canceled prematurely, which could disrupt the expected trading logic.
Vulnerability Details
The function documentation states that an order can be canceled only after it expires. However, the function only checks whether _gmxLock == false before allowing cancellation. It does not validate whether the order has actually exceeded the expiration time.
This introduces a potential issue where:
An order could be canceled immediately after being placed, even if it is still valid.
A malicious or careless keeper could exploit this by canceling orders prematurely, preventing them from executing as intended.
The trading logic that depends on order execution could be disrupted, leading to missed trading opportunities or financial loss.
Impact
Orders may be canceled too early, leading to failed trades.
The keeper could manipulate order execution by canceling valid orders, impacting users or automated strategies.
Users relying on expected execution times may experience unintended losses due to order cancellations happening before expiration.
Tools Used
Manual Code Review
Recommendations
Add an expiration time check before allowing an order to be canceled.
Lead Judging Commences
Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers
Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."
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