Liquidity Management
Gamma
DeFiFoundry
50,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

M-#01 Missing validation in the initialization

0xmad

Summary : In GmxProxy.sol :: function initialize is missing input validation for all the addresses given.

Vulnerability Details : When function initialize in the GmxProxy.sol is called to initialize, several external contract addresses are assigned without validation for zero addresses and that the given contract addresses are valid or not and,if mistaknely provided may get initillized to address(0') or non valid addresses causing the protocol to break.

function initialize(
address _orderHandler,
address _liquidationHandler,
address _adlHandler,
address _gExchangeRouter,
address _gmxRouter,
address _dataStore,
address _orderVault,
address _gmxReader,
address _referralStorage
) external initializer {
__Ownable2Step_init();
orderHandler = _orderHandler;
liquidationHandler = _liquidationHandler;
adlHandler = _adlHandler;
gExchangeRouter = IExchangeRouter(_gExchangeRouter);
gmxRouter = _gmxRouter;
dataStore = IDataStore(_dataStore);
orderVault = _orderVault;
gmxReader = IGmxReader(_gmxReader);
referralStorage = _referralStorage;
minEth = 0.002 ether;
}
​
​
receive() external payable {}

Impact : As the initialize function is called only once , the inputs should be properly validated before getting initialized. The protocol functionality mainly depends on these contracts doing what they are intended to ,so any improper initailization causes the protocol to lose the functionality of that contract.

Tools Used : Manual Review

Recommendations : Validate all the addresses

function initialize(
address _orderHandler,
address _liquidationHandler,
address _adlHandler,
address _gExchangeRouter,
address _gmxRouter,
address _dataStore,
address _orderVault,
address _gmxReader,
address _referralStorage
) external initializer {
__Ownable2Step_init();
// Address validation
require(_orderHandler != address(0), "Invalid orderHandler address");
require(_liquidationHandler != address(0), "Invalid liquidationHandler address");
require(_adlHandler != address(0), "Invalid adlHandler address");
require(_gExchangeRouter != address(0), "Invalid gExchangeRouter address");
require(_gmxRouter != address(0), "Invalid gmxRouter address");
require(_dataStore != address(0), "Invalid dataStore address");
require(_orderVault != address(0), "Invalid orderVault address");
require(_gmxReader != address(0), "Invalid gmxReader address");
require(_referralStorage != address(0), "Invalid referralStorage address");
​
// Assign state variables
orderHandler = _orderHandler;
liquidationHandler = _liquidationHandler;
adlHandler = _adlHandler;
gExchangeRouter = IExchangeRouter(_gExchangeRouter);
gmxRouter = _gmxRouter;
dataStore = IDataStore(_dataStore);
orderVault = _orderVault;
gmxReader = IGmxReader(_gmxReader);
referralStorage = _referralStorage;
minEth = 0.002 ether;
}
​
​
receive() external payable {}
​
```
​
​
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 8 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 8 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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