The getExecutionGasLimit() function in the GmxProxy contract accepts a _callbackGasLimit parameter from external inputs without imposing any upper limit. A malicious or compromised keeper can pass an excessively large value, resulting in inflated execution fees paid by users. This can lead to unnecessary fund depletion or potentially prevent operations due to prohibitively high fees, causing a Denial of Service (DoS) for users attempting to interact with the protocol.
In GmxProxy.sol -> function getExecutionGasLimit
function getExecutionGasLimit(
Order.OrderType orderType,
uint256 _callbackGasLimit
) public view returns (uint256 executionGasLimit) {
...
executionGasLimit =
baseGasLimit +
((estimatedGasLimit + _callbackGasLimit) * multiplierFactor) / PRECISION;
}
The callbackGasLimit parameter is provided externally, and the **callbackGasLimit**can also be updated by the owner without an upper limit . There is no upper bound validation on this parameter in both cases. This unchecked value is added to the estimated gas limit and used to calculate the execution fee. A malicious actor (either the owner or a keeper) can set or submit (either intentionally or accidentaly) an excessively high _callbackGasLimit, resulting in:
Excessive gas fees paid by users for deposit, withdrawal, or position adjustments.
Potential DoS, as users may be unable to afford the excessively high execution fees.
Severity Assessment:
Impact: Medium – Direct financial loss to users, and potential inability to manage leveraged positions.
**Likelihood: Low **– Requires malicious/accidental action from a trusted keeper or owner.
In the
Implement an upper bound validation check for _callbackGasLimit to prevent excessive values:
Example:
1.Add the consttant MAX_CALLBACKGAS_LIMIT to the GMXPROXY.sol
2.Add the rquired check to the getExecutionGasLimit line 162.
Also, in PerpetualVault.sol, when setting callbackGasLimit via setCallbackGasLimit() function, add an upper limit check to avoid excessive values:
This approach will help prevent unintended or malicious configurations that could harm protocol users.
Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."
There is no real proof, concrete root cause, specific impact, or enough details in those submissions. Examples include: "It could happen" without specifying when, "If this impossible case happens," "Unexpected behavior," etc. Make a Proof of Concept (PoC) using external functions and realistic parameters. Do not test only the internal function where you think you found something.
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