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Gamma
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

Missing Minimum Validation for `lockTime` in PerpetualVault

m3dython

Details:
The setLockTime function in the PerpetualVault contract allows the owner to set the lockTime parameter without enforcing a minimum value. The lockTime is used to determine how long a deposit must remain locked before a withdrawal is allowed. If the owner sets this value too low (or even to zero), it could undermine the intended time-lock mechanism.

Root Cause:
There is no input validation in the setLockTime function to ensure that the new lock time meets the minimum threshold of 1 day specified in the README. The absence of these checks means that any value, including unintended low values, can be set by the owner.

Impact:

  • Premature Withdrawals: Depositors may be able to withdraw their funds immediately or before the intended lock period has elapsed, potentially leading to liquidity issues or other unintended financial dynamics.

  • Misaligned User Expectations: Users expecting a minimum lock period as part of the deposit terms could be misled if the lock time is reduced below that threshold.

  • Governance Risk: Although only the owner can call this function, a misconfiguration (either accidental or malicious) can compromise the protocol’s stability and user trust.

Recommendation:

  • Input Validation: Modify the setLockTime function to include a check that enforces a minimum lock period (e.g., no less than 1 week or another protocol-defined minimum).

  • Revert on Invalid Input: Ensure that the function reverts with a clear error message if the provided _lockTime is below the minimum required threshold.

  • Documentation: Clearly document the minimum allowed value in the function’s comments to set proper expectations.

Proof of Concept:

  1. The owner calls setLockTime(0).

  2. The function sets lockTime to 0 because there is no check.

  3. A depositor makes a deposit, and the contract records the deposit timestamp.

  4. When the depositor attempts to withdraw, the check:

    if (depositInfo[depositId].timestamp + lockTime >= block.timestamp) {
    revert Error.Locked();
    }

    will pass immediately since depositInfo[depositId].timestamp + 0 is always less than block.timestamp after the transaction, allowing immediate withdrawal regardless of the intended lock period.

By implementing a minimum validation, the protocol can better safeguard against premature withdrawals and maintain the intended deposit lock duration.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 8 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 8 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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