Liquidity Management
Gamma
DeFiFoundry
50,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

Owner Can Arbitrarily Modify Vault State

maze

Summary

The setVaultState function in PerpetualVault allows the owner to directly modify critical protocol state variables, including flow control, position data, and locking mechanisms without validation or events. While protected by onlyOwner, this unconstrained access could disrupt protocol operations.

Vulnerability Details

function setVaultState(
FLOW _flow,
uint256 _flowData,
bool _beenLong,
bytes32 _curPositionKey,
bool _positionIsClosed,
bool _isLock,
Action memory _nextAction
) external onlyOwner {
flow = _flow;
flowData = _flowData;
beenLong = _beenLong;
curPositionKey = _curPositionKey;
positionIsClosed = _positionIsClosed;
_gmxLock = _isLock;
nextAction = _nextAction;
}

Vulnerable aspects:

  1. No input validation on critical state variables

  2. No events emitted for state changes

  3. Can override active operations

  4. No emergency mode requirement

  5. Direct manipulation of position tracking

Example exploit scenario:

// Owner could disrupt active positions
await vault.setVaultState(
FLOW.NONE, // Reset ongoing operations
0, // Clear flow data
false, // Change position direction
bytes32(0), // Clear position key
true, // Mark position as closed
false, // Disable GMX lock
{ // Reset next action
selector: 0,
data: "0x"
}
);

Impact

Severity: Low

The vulnerability is mitigated by:

  1. onlyOwner modifier protection

  2. Two-step ownership transfer via Ownable2StepUpgradeable

  3. Owner is already trusted with other admin functions

However, potential impacts include:

  • Disruption of active trading positions

  • Interference with user deposits/withdrawals

  • Inconsistent protocol state

  • Loss of position tracking

Tools Used

  • Manual code review

  • Static analysis

  • Review of PerpetualVault.sol implementation

Recommendations

  1. Add input validation and emergency mode:

bool public emergencyMode;
​
modifier onlyEmergency() {
require(emergencyMode, "Not in emergency mode");
_;
}
​
function setVaultState(
FLOW _flow,
uint256 _flowData,
bool _beenLong,
bytes32 _curPositionKey,
bool _positionIsClosed,
bool _isLock,
Action memory _nextAction
) external onlyOwner onlyEmergency {
require(_flow == FLOW.NONE || _flow == FLOW.LIQUIDATION, "Invalid flow state");
require(_curPositionKey != bytes32(0) || _positionIsClosed, "Invalid position state");
​
flow = _flow;
flowData = _flowData;
beenLong = _beenLong;
curPositionKey = _curPositionKey;
positionIsClosed = _positionIsClosed;
_gmxLock = _isLock;
nextAction = _nextAction;
​
emit VaultStateUpdated(_flow, _flowData, _beenLong, _curPositionKey,
_positionIsClosed, _isLock, _nextAction);
}

  1. Add events for transparency:

event VaultStateUpdated(
FLOW flow,
uint256 flowData,
bool beenLong,
bytes32 curPositionKey,
bool positionIsClosed,
bool isLock,
Action nextAction
);

  1. Consider implementing a timelock for sensitive changes

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 6 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

Suppositions

There is no real proof, concrete root cause, specific impact, or enough details in those submissions. Examples include: "It could happen" without specifying when, "If this impossible case happens," "Unexpected behavior," etc. Make a Proof of Concept (PoC) using external functions and realistic parameters. Do not test only the internal function where you think you found something.

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