Liquidity Management
Gamma
DeFiFoundry
50,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

Inconsistent Price Threshold Validation Between setDataFeed and (setThreshold and setMaxTimeWindow Function)

codertjay

Summary

The setDataFeed function allows setting a price difference threshold (_threshold) to zero, which bypasses critical
price validation checks and contradicts the validation enforced in the separate setThreshold function.
and also the maxTimeWindow can be zero bypassing the setMaxTimeWindow

Vulnerability Details

In KeeperProxy.sol, there are two ways to set price difference thresholds:

  1. Via setDataFeed:

function setDataFeed(address token, address feed, uint256 _maxTimeWindow, uint256 _threshold) external onlyOwner {
// No validation of _threshold
priceDiffThreshold[token] = _threshold;
// And also no validation for _maxTimeWindow
maxTimeWindow[token] = _maxTimeWindow;
}

  1. Via setThreshold:

function setThreshold(address token, uint256 _threshold) external onlyOwner {
require(_threshold > 0, "zero value");
priceDiffThreshold[token] = _threshold;
}

The _threshold parameter is used in price validation:

require(
_absDiff(price, chainLinkPrice.toUint256()) * BPS / chainLinkPrice.toUint256() < priceDiffThreshold[token],
"price offset too big"
);

A zero threshold effectively disables the price difference check as any price difference will be less than zero.

  1. Via setMaxTimeWindow:

function setMaxTimeWindow(address token, uint256 _maxTimeWindow) external onlyOwner {
require(_maxTimeWindow > 0, "zero value");
maxTimeWindow[token] = _maxTimeWindow;
}

But on the setDataFeed there was no validation

Impact

LOW - While concerning, the impact is limited because:

  1. Only owner can set thresholds

  2. Owner is already trusted

  3. Separate setThreshold function enforces non-zero values

  4. Easily detectable off-chain

Tools Used

  • Manual code review

  • Foundry test framework

Recommendations

Add validation in setDataFeed:

function setDataFeed(address token, address feed, uint256 _maxTimeWindow, uint256 _threshold) external onlyOwner {
require(token != address(0), "zero address");
require(feed != address(0), "zero address");
require(_threshold > 0, "zero threshold"); // Add this check
require(_maxTimeWindow > 0, "zero value"); // Add this check
dataFeed[token] = feed;
maxTimeWindow[token] = _maxTimeWindow;
priceDiffThreshold[token] = _threshold;
}

Alternatively, remove threshold setting from setDataFeed and require it to be set separately via setThreshold which already has the validation.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 6 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 6 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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