Liquidity Management

Summary

• The getPositionInfo, getNegativeFundingFeeAmount, and getPnl functions incorrectly use sizeInTokens to store the result of getPositionSizeInUsd() (USD value), while using it to check for token existence.

• Code Snippet:

  // Flawed Implementation

  uint256 sizeInTokens = getPositionSizeInUsd(key); // Misnamed variable

  if (sizeInTokens == 0) { // Checks USD value to determine token existence

  return PositionData(..., sizeInTokens: 0, ...);

  }

Impact

• Critical: Positions with valid token balances () but $0 USD value (e.g., token price crashes) will be:

  1. Treated as non-existent (incorrect liquidation)

  2. Excluded from protocol TVL calculations

  3. Unavailable for user interactions (withdrawals/transfers)

Proof of Concept

Test Case: test_zero_usd_position_returns_valid_token_size

Expected Failure:

Recommendations

1. Code Fix:

   function getPositionInfo(...) ... {

   uint256 sizeInUsd = getPositionSizeInUsd(key); // Correct USD value

   uint256 sizeInTokens = getPositionSizeInTokens(key); // Correct token value

   if (sizeInUsd == 0) { // Check USD, not tokens

   return PositionData(..., sizeInTokens, ...); // Preserve token data

   }

   }

2. Validation:

   forge test --match-test test_zero_usd_position_returns_valid_token_size -vvv

   # Pre-fix: Test fails (token size = 0)

   # Post-fix: Test passes (token size = 100e18)

Completeness Check

Missing:

• Tests for other affected functions (getNegativeFundingFeeAmount, getPnl)

• Fuzz testing to validate across random sizes