DeFiFoundry
50,000 USDC
View results
Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

should check if `indexToken` is the same as `longToken` when deploy PerpetualVault contract

Summary

should check if indexToken is the same as longToken when deploy PerpetualVault contract

Vulnerability Details

From the description of PerpetualVault.sol, we can see the flowing instructions:

For now, we only support the GMX market in which indexToken is the same as longToken.

However, whether indexToken is the same as longToken is not checked when deploy PerpetualVault contract.

function initialize(
address _market,
address _keeper,
address _treasury,
address _gmxProxy,
address _vaultReader,
uint256 _minDepositAmount,
uint256 _maxDepositAmount,
uint256 _leverage
) external initializer {
__Ownable2Step_init();
__ReentrancyGuard_init();
if (
_market == address(0) ||
_gmxProxy == address(0) ||
_keeper == address(0) ||
_vaultReader == address(0) ||
_treasury == address(0)
) {
revert Error.ZeroValue();
}
market = _market;
IGmxProxy(_gmxProxy).setPerpVault(address(this), market);
gmxProxy = IGmxProxy(_gmxProxy);
MarketProps memory marketInfo = IVaultReader(_vaultReader).getMarket(market);
indexToken = marketInfo.indexToken;(
address _market,
address _keeper,
address _treasury,
address _gmxProxy,
address _vaultReader,
uint256 _minDepositAmount,
uint256 _maxDepositAmount,
uint256 _leverage
) external initializer {
__Ownable2Step_init();
__ReentrancyGuard_init();
if (
_market == address(0) ||
_gmxProxy == address(0) ||
_keeper == address(0) ||
_vaultReader == address(0) ||
_treasury == address(0)
) {
revert Error.ZeroValue();
}
market = _market;
IGmxProxy(_gmxProxy).setPerpVault(address(this), market);
gmxProxy = IGmxProxy(_gmxProxy);
MarketProps memory marketInfo = IVaultReader(_vaultReader).getMarket(market);
indexToken = marketInfo.indexToken;
...
}

Impact

PerpetualVault contract may be deployed with a market, whose indexToken is not the same as longToken.

Tools Used

manually reviewed

Recommendations

add the following checks to function initialize:

require(marketInfo.indexToken == marketInfo.longToken, "indexToken is not the same as longToken");
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 5 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 5 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.