Liquidity Management
Gamma
DeFiFoundry
50,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

In PerpetualVault :: setMinMaxDepositAmount min amount can be max and vice versa this can lead to DOS on function like deposit etc

uncontrolledking

[H-2] In PerpetualVault :: setMinMaxDepositAmount min amount can be max and vice versa this can lead to DOS on function like deposit etc

Vulnerability Details:
In setMinMaxDepositAmount() since there is no require that the _minDepositAmount must be less than the _maxDepositAmount , this can lead to DOS on core functions if set wrongly causing users not able to make a deposit

Impact:
deposit will always revert if this is set wrongly by mistake

Proof of Concept:

function setMinMaxDepositAmount(uint256 _minDepositAmount, uint256 _maxDepositAmount) external onlyOwner {
minDepositAmount = _minDepositAmount;
maxDepositAmount = _maxDepositAmount;
}

Proof of Code

function testWrongSettingMinAndMaxCauseDOSOnDeposit() public {
// this issue allows the minimum deposit to be more than the maximum deposit
vm.prank( PerpetualVault(vault).owner());
PerpetualVault(vault).setMinMaxDepositAmount(1000, 100);
// the minimum Deposist amount is greater than the max deposit amount
assertGt(PerpetualVault(vault).minDepositAmount(), PerpetualVault(vault).maxDepositAmount());
IERC20 collateralToken = PerpetualVault(vault).collateralToken();
address mike = makeAddr("mike");
// Get USDC token and setup deposit
address whale = 0x489ee077994B6658eAfA855C308275EAd8097C4A;
vm.startPrank(whale);
uint256 amount = 1e10;
collateralToken.transfer(mike, amount);
vm.stopPrank();
// Create deposit and order
vm.startPrank(mike);
uint256 executionFee = PerpetualVault(vault).getExecutionGasLimit(true);
collateralToken.approve(vault, amount);
PerpetualVault(vault).deposit{value: executionFee * tx.gasprice}(amount);
vm.stopPrank();
​
​
MarketPrices memory prices = mockData.getMarketPrices();
bytes[] memory data = new bytes[](2);
data[0] = abi.encode(3380000000000000);
address keeper = PerpetualVault(vault).keeper();
vm.prank(keeper);
PerpetualVault(vault).run(true, false, prices, data);
GmxOrderExecuted(true);
delete data;
vm.prank(keeper);
PerpetualVault(vault).runNextAction(prices, data);
}

Recommended Mitigation:
Kindly require that the min amount is always lesser than the max amount , you can also add some threshold in both min and max

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 5 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 5 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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