Liquidity Management
Gamma
DeFiFoundry
50,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

Unvalidated Constructor Parameters Allow Zero Addresses

satpamblockchain

[L-01] Unvalidated Constructor Parameters Allow Zero Addresses

Description

The VaultReader contract's constructor accepts critical contract addresses without validating them. This could allow zero addresses or invalid contracts to be set during deployment.

Impact

LOW - Deployment safety issue

  • Could deploy with invalid addresses

  • Requires redeployment to fix

  • No direct user funds at risk

  • Caught during deployment testing

Proof of Concept

contract VaultReader {
constructor(
address orderHandler,
address dataStore,
address orderVault,
address reader,
address referralStorage
) {
// No validation
_orderHandler = orderHandler;
_dataStore = dataStore;
_orderVault = orderVault;
_reader = reader;
_referralStorage = referralStorage;
}
}

Exploit test:

function testZeroAddressDeployment() public {
vm.expectRevert();
new VaultReader(
address(0), // orderHandler
address(0), // dataStore
address(0), // orderVault
address(0), // reader
address(0) // referralStorage
);
}

Root Cause

Missing validation in constructor:

  1. No zero address checks

  2. No contract existence checks

  3. No interface validation

Recommendations

Short Term

Add basic address validation:

constructor(
address orderHandler,
address dataStore,
address orderVault,
address reader,
address referralStorage
) {
require(orderHandler != address(0), "Invalid orderHandler");
require(dataStore != address(0), "Invalid dataStore");
require(orderVault != address(0), "Invalid orderVault");
require(reader != address(0), "Invalid reader");
require(referralStorage != address(0), "Invalid referralStorage");
_orderHandler = orderHandler;
_dataStore = dataStore;
_orderVault = orderVault;
_reader = reader;
_referralStorage = referralStorage;
}

Long Term

  1. Implement interface checks

  2. Add contract existence verification

  3. Consider using proxy pattern

  4. Add deployment scripts with validation

Risk Assessment

Impact Analysis

  • Technical: Low (deployment only)

  • Scope: Contract initialization

  • Complexity: Low (simple validation)

Affected Components

  • Contract deployment

  • Initial configuration

  • Contract upgrades

Timeline

  • Found: February 20, 2025

  • Reported: February 21, 2025

  • Fixed: Pending

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 5 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 5 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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