Liquidity Management
Gamma
DeFiFoundry
50,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

Failed user transfer sends funds to treasury without fee adjustment.

kwakudr

Summary

Failed user transfer sends funds to treasury without fee adjustment.

Vulnerability Details

function _transferToken(uint256 depositId, uint256 amount) internal {
uint256 fee;
if (amount > depositInfo\[depositId].amount) {
fee = (amount - depositInfo\[depositId].amount) \* governanceFee / BASIS\_POINTS\_DIVISOR;
if (fee > 0) {
collateralToken.safeTransfer(treasury, fee);
}
}
try collateralToken.transfer(depositInfo[depositId].recipient, amount - fee) {}
catch {
collateralToken.transfer(treasury, amount - fee);
emit TokenTranferFailed(depositInfo[depositId].recipient, amount - fee);
}
totalDepositAmount -= depositInfo[depositId].amount;
​
emit GovernanceFeeCollected(address(collateralToken), fee);

Scenario:

  • Initial amount: 1000 tokens

  • Original deposit: 800 tokens

  • Fee calculated: (1000-800) * 5% = 10 tokens

  • Remaining for user: 990 tokens

If user transfer fails:

  • 10 tokens already sent to treasury as fee

  • Remaining 990 tokens also sent to treasury

  • Treasury receives 1000 tokens instead of just 10

State Before:

  • Treasury expected: fee amount

  • User expected: amount - fee

  • Total: amount

State After Failed Transfer:

  • Treasury actual: amount (fee + user portion)

  • User actual: 0

  • Total: amount (but all in treasury)

Example Calculation:
Original Intent:

  • User withdrawal: 1000 tokens

  • Profit: 200 tokens

  • Fee (5%): 10 tokens

  • Expected user: 990 tokens

  • Expected treasury: 10 tokens

After Failed Transfer:

  • Treasury gets: 1000 tokens

  • User gets: 0 tokens

  • Fee calculation ignored

No guarantee second transfer succeeds. Could leave funds stuck in contract. No mechanism to recover from double transfer failure.

Impact

Funds will be stuck when the try catch fails

Tools Used

Foundry

Recommendations

Separate Fee and Transfer Logic and use Safe Transfer Implementation.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 3 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Design choice
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 3 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Design choice
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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