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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

Use of hardcoded value for address validation in ParaSwapUtils

danzero

Summary

The ParaSwapUtils library is designed to facilitate token swaps using the ParaSwap protocol. However, it relies on a hardcoded address to validate calldata which can cause transactions to revert, funds stuck in the contract, and an attack vector for malicious entity.

Vulnerability Details

Below is a snippet of the _validateCallData function from ParaSwapUtils.sol:

function _validateCallData(address to, bytes memory callData) internal view {
require(to == address(0xDEF171Fe48CF0115B1d80b88dc8eAB59176FEe57), "invalid paraswap callee");
address receiver;
assembly {
receiver := mload(add(callData, 196))
}
require(receiver == address(this), "invalid paraswap calldata");
}

It enforces that the to address is equal to 0xDEF171Fe48CF0115B1d80b88dc8eAB59176FEe57.

This function is used in the swap function in the library which ensures that all swap operations are restricted to the hardcoded ParaSwap contract address.

Impact

If ParaSwap upgrades or migrates to a new contract, this library will become obsolete, transactions will fail, potentially resulting in funds getting stuck in the contract. Even if the protocol can redeploy the contract to mitigate this issue, redeploying the contract every time there's a change of address in external dependency is costly and impractical. Another concern is if the protocol plan to expand to another chain and 0xDEF171Fe48CF0115B1d80b88dc8eAB59176FEe57 belongs to a malicious entity.

Tools Used

Manual review

Recommendations

Implementing a function to update the Paraswap address restricted to authorized entities, would provide a controlled way to update the contract address when necessary.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 3 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Design choice
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 3 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Design choice
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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