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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

GmxProxy::withdrawEth prevents execution of any pending actions, leading to DOS

Vulnerability Details

GmxProxy::withdrawEth is an onlyOwner function which withdraws all ETH from the contract. According to the docs, this contract should have a minimum of 0.002 ETH. Without this balance, some functions in the PerpetualVault and GmxProxy are not executed and will revert. These include PerpetualVault::run(), which contains the following check:

if (gmxProxy.lowerThanMinEth()) {
revert Error.LowerThanMinEth();
}

It also includes GmxProxy::createOrder and GmxProxy::settle which contain the following statement:

require(
address(this).balance >= positionExecutionFee,
"insufficient eth balance"
);

GmxProxy::withdrawEth does not check for pending orders or a blank queue before executing the withdrawal, and it does not allow for withdrawal amounts lower than the contract balance.

Impact

Temporary DOS of the contract and the connected vault until some funds are sent back to GmxProxy. Loss of most functionality of the vault.

Proof Of Concept

Comment out the following lines in PerpetualVault.t.sol and run the tests to simulate gmxProxy with no balance.

// payable(gmxProxy).transfer(1 ether);
.
.
.
// payable(gmxProxy2x).transfer(1 ether);

13/16 of the tests in PerpetualVault.t.sol fail if the gmxProxy does not have sufficient balance. testFuzz_Deposit(uint96), test_Revert_DepositIf_Paused(), and test_Withdraw() are the only tests to pass.

Recommendations

  1. Before emptying funds from GmxProxy, check for any pending actions being executed by the contract or the connected vault.

  2. Allow withdrawal of custom amounts so that even after a withdrawal, a minimum amount of ether can be maintained in the contract.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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