Liquidity Management
Gamma
DeFiFoundry
50,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

Centralized control over the ETH in the `GmxProxy` contract

sparrowblck

[M-02] Summary

Centralized control over the ETH in the GmxProxy contract

Vulnerability Details

Native token (usually ETH) is sent to the GmxProxy contract inside PerpetualVault::_payExecutionFee(), which is called during both the deposit and withdrawal flows. The amount of the native token is proportional to the msg.value which the sender has submitted to the payable deposit and withdraw functions, and that is deliberately not restricted. This would result in arbitrary funds being kept inside the GmxProxy, which can be claimed at any point by the contracts owner.

While it is good to have a mechanism to retrieve stuck tokens from a contract which has several payable functions, there are no guarantees about the specifics of the owner. It could be a contract or EOA, which means these fees can be moved to the owner at any point in time.

Impact

High - native token funds could be rug pulled by a single entity. Likelyhood - low, as the owner would need to be malicious or compromised.

Tools Used

Manual review.

Recommendations

Have more transparency when retrieving stuck tokens, the best way would be to send the native tokens to the treasury contract, which could have remediation mechanisms to send out missing funds to users upon request and manual review. In addition, any such movements of funds are an important part of the contract's lifecycle, and therefore should be accompanied by emitting an appropriate events.

​
+ address treasury;
+ event ETHSentToTreasury(address treasury, uint256 amount);
​
function initialize(
address _orderHandler,
address _liquidationHandler,
address _adlHandler,
address _gExchangeRouter,
address _gmxRouter,
address _dataStore,
address _orderVault,
address _gmxReader,
address _referralStorage,
+ address _treasury
) external initializer {
__Ownable2Step_init();
orderHandler = _orderHandler;
liquidationHandler = _liquidationHandler;
adlHandler = _adlHandler;
gExchangeRouter = IExchangeRouter(_gExchangeRouter);
gmxRouter = _gmxRouter;
dataStore = IDataStore(_dataStore);
orderVault = _orderVault;
gmxReader = IGmxReader(_gmxReader);
referralStorage = _referralStorage;
minEth = 0.002 ether;
+ treasury = _treasury;
}
​
​
function withdrawEth() external onlyOwner returns (uint256) {
uint256 balance = address(this).balance;
- payable(msg.sender).transfer(balance);
+ // We assume the treasury is a contract with appropriate fund remediation mechanisms
+ payable(treasury).transfer(balance);
​
+ emit ETHSentToTreasury(treasury, balance);
return balance;
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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